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Abstract: Monetary policies and adjustments during a financial crisis depend on policy-makers’ 
conceptions on what money is and how it works. There is sufficient consensus among scholars that 
money is an institution created within the economic system and is in line with other institutions that 
regulate economic action. However, there are different understandings of what institutions are and 
how they operate, and these understandings imply differences in terms of monetary enforcement, 
resilience, responsiveness and stability. This paper discusses the two main approaches that 
conceptualise institutions as rules and as practices presenting an empirically informed discussion 
of money as an institution drawing on these insights. It grounds the analysis on the empirical case 
of Argentina as a monetary laboratory and the plurality of currencies that circulate in its economy. 
The study argues that while the official currency of Argentina corresponds to the institutions as 
rules approach, the adoption of the U.S. dollar into a bimonetary economy evolved as equilibrium. 
In between, the massive community currency systems that rose and declined during the economic 
meltdown between 1998 and 2002 were a hybrid institution that combined rules and practice. All 
three of them show various degrees of resilience and stability.  
Keywords: economic institutions; currency; monetary plurality; Argentina  
 
1. Introduction 
Every financial crisis poses the question of what sustains money and how it recovers from a 
downfall. In the last financial crisis, these questions were coupled with reflections on whether a 
different understanding of money should not imply another regulatory framework to prevent or 
ameliorate the toll that crisis takes on human beings. A discussion on the configuration of money and 
its stability hence seems timely.  
There are two main narratives on the origin and meanings of money, one which corresponds to 
a spontaneous or evolutionary approach, and the other a centrally designed or rule oriented 
approach. Tymoigne and Wray (2006: 1) explain that in one view money is portrayed as a “cost-
reducing innovation to replace barter” while in a rather unknown way individual utility maximizers 
settled on a single numeraire (. This narrative translates in modern days into money being considered 
a given because it has happened an undefined long time ago and it is sustained by the expectation 
that it will continue to function. In contrast, heterodox approaches to money underline its social and 
political essence as the outcome of a historical process of negotiations and impositions by central 
authorities. The process is ongoing. Money is conceptualized as an institution which links individuals 
with each other and with the social world. Aglietta and Orlean (2002) offer a sophisticated argument 
on how money creates social bonds that support trade and social relations but clouds the specificity 
of relations and commodities. In this heterodox view, money is sustained by organisations, laws and 
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rules that represent the institutions of the monetary system, and rests on the trust that money will 
deliver the usual monetary functions. Authorities, namely the state but also other agents such as 
banks and merchants’ associations, participate in the process of structuring and imposing money 
over a sovereign territory, even by force if necessary (Cohen 1999, Wray 2004).  
These two views leave us with a number of puzzles which are not specifically addressed. To 
start with, there are hardly any countries in the world in which the state´s monopoly of one currency 
in the whole nation is complete. In the last three decades over 50 countries have hosted numerous 
local and complementary currencies that attempt to improve the responsiveness and inclusiveness of 
the monetary system (Blanc 2012, 2016, Michel and Hudon 2015, Seyfang and Longhurst 2013). These 
are often sustained by social agreements, with the occasional participation of state actors, and are 
considered “niches” (Seyfang and Longhurst 2013). They may be more than niches, as Greece and 
Italy, two EU member states, are exploring the introduction of local parallel currencies in the form of 
tax anticipation scripts which would allow them to retain the euro for national and international 
transactions (Bossone et al. 2015, Théret et al. 2015). Finally, at the global level the state’s monopoly 
is being challenged by cryptocurrencies that facilitate counting and transferring value across borders 
and that enables an underground global economy. These trends suggest that the configuration of 
money, as a central economic institution, cannot be explained as the result of only central authority 
or practice. While money is normally established by states, it also circulates by simple practice, and 
sometimes these practices are contested or abandoned. How do economies go from these financial 
disruptions into new monetary practices? 
An accepted definition of institutions, such as money, claims that they are “socially embedded 
systems of rules” that both constrain and enable social action (Hodgson 2006). In that sense, they 
bridge individuals with the social world because institutions exist in the minds as well as “out there” 
(Hodgson 2003; Gomez and Ritchie 2016). Institutional theory offers two main understandings on the 
construction of institutions and these have been intensely debated among institutionalists such as 
Kingston and Caballero (2009); Greif and Kingston (2011); Brousseau et al. (2011) and Hindriks and 
Guala (2015). The two competing accounts on institutional configuration conceptualise institutions 
as rules versus institutions as evolved equilibria.  
This article engages with money as an institution and takes a step further to explore the 
implications of understanding money in this way. How do money (or moneys) get established among 
economic institutions, what factors sustain it and why does it change? The article aims at presenting 
an empirically informed discussion of money as an institution drawing on insights from the two main 
strands of institutional theory. This paper combines the two theoretical perspectives on institutional 
emergence to analyse different categories and configurations of money. The study avoids a 
discussion on which one of the two conceptualisations of institutions is more appropriate but 
considers that both views highlight different aspects of the various types of money. There are moneys 
that have been centrally designed while others have evolved rather spontaneously. A critical 
implication of conceptualizing money as an institution is that they are bound to be contextually 
diverse (Blanc 2016, Gómez and Dini 2016, Ingham 1998). The approach in this paper is different to 
the way other authors that have discussed money as an institution (for example, Aglietta and Orleans 
2002; Wray 2004; Arestis and Sawyer 2006) in unveiling the varieties of money and exploring the fact 
that monies are institutions of various kinds. 
The discussion is grounded in an empirical case in which there are different monies, a 
phenomenon termed plurality of money defined by the concurrent existence of more than one type 
of money in a particular space (Gómez 2018, Kuroda 2008). Such a setting was found in Argentina in 
the period of 1998–2002, in which there were five different types of money circulating in the country 
at the same time (Gómez and Dini 2016). In order to gain depth, the study will explain this scenario 
of monetary plurality in which sovereign money was centrally designed and other monetary 
practices came about spontaneously. It will later focus on the group of community currencies used 
by a total estimate of six million people around 2002. There were a few hundred of these currencies, 
created by grassroots organisations and generically known as créditos.  
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The study is based on both primary and secondary data, including previous research and 
reports. The primary data was gathered during several periods of fieldwork between 2004 and 2013 
and is part of a larger database that includes a multimedia collection, survey data, focus groups, and 
expert interviews. Three periods of fieldwork were carried out in 2003, 2004 and 2006 to gather data 
at the level of participants and the coordinators of 45 modes across the country. The initiators, the 
three founders of the initiative, academic experts and regional leaders were interviewed at the same 
time and later on in 2009 and 2013. Interviews were held individually and collectively several times 
in order to reconstruct its evolution based on oral history. A survey with a semi-structured 
questionnaire was carried out among participants and it resulted in 386 responses. The next section 
will discuss the two approaches to institutions, namely the institutions as rules and the institutions 
as equilibria. The third section will focus on the emergence of the bimonetary system in Argentina 
(pesos and U.S. dollars) and the fourth section will analyse the complementary currency systems 
created at the grassroots. The last section offers some further reflection in terms of resilience, 
responsiveness and stability of currencies.  
2. Institutions: Rules or Practices 
Money is conceptualized as an institution, a term that has a number of definitions. Douglas 
North provided the definition that has probably become the most frequently quoted one in scholarly 
work: “Institutions are the rules of the game” (North 1990). Another Economics Nobel Prize winner, 
Elinor Ostrom, defined institutions in a similar way, as the prescriptions that are used to organize 
“all forms of repetitive and structured interactions” within communities, organisations, markets and 
so on (Ostrom 2005). Indeed, all social interaction is mediated or regulated by institutions that 
indicate “the way we do things around here” as phrased by Hall (1986). 
The origin of the social structures that create stability and continuity in society is a point of 
contention. At the risk of simplification, there are two main accounts on how institutions originate 
and how they change or resist change, and have been discussed by scholars such as Kingston and 
Caballero (2009); Brousseau et al (2011); Hindriks and Guala (2015); Hodgson (2015) and others. 
Despite some variation among authors, a first strand that sees institutions as rules that come out of 
purposeful design. Kingston and Caballero (2009) refer to this view as the “centralized” or 
“designed” version, while Hodgson (2015) and Greif and Kingston (2011) refer to “institutions as 
rules” and Brousseau et al. (2011) use the label of “constraining rules”. In this strand, motivated 
agents express their preferences and negotiate, and exert pressure to push or block institutional 
changes according to their interests and benefit. The making of institutions is deliberate, centralized 
and assumes collective action because actors come together to bargain and make decisions or at times 
one exerts authority over others. In these negotiations, agents act according to their interests and in 
consideration of the existing rules. At the same time, negotiations are affected by authority and power 
asymmetries that favour the or voice or views of some decision-makers over the position of others. 
When it comes to institutional change, the focus is similarly placed on bargaining and consenting 
within the limits permitted or enabled by “rules of a higher order” (Ostrom 2005). Additionally, some 
actors, like judges, have special roles to play in the change of rules because they pass new legislation 
or mediate as rule makers. These special agents are rather “autonomous drivers of change” (Kingston 
and Caballero 2009, p. 158). 
Critiquing this approach of institutions, Kingston and Caballero (2009) argue that rules may exist 
on paper but do not necessarily drive agents’ behaviour. Then, to what extent are those to be 
considered institutions at all? Ostrom (2005) distinguishes between “rules in form” (on paper) and 
“rules in use” (effectively observed), and the rules in form do not actually steer people’s behaviour. 
There are also rules that are observed but do not exist on paper, such as most informal rules which 
refer to culture. These are seen as adaptations to the context and to previous events, but without 
undergoing rational and consensual reform. They may become formalized, hence changing from 
rules in use, to rule in form.  
A second strand of institutional theories underlines their evolutionary nature. Kingston and 
Caballero (2009) refer to them as “evolutionary”, while Brousseau et al (2011) opts for the label “self-
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enforcing expectations”; and Greif and Kingston (2011), Hindriks and Guala (2015) as well as Aoki 
and Hayami (2001) prefer the term “institutions as equilibria”. According to this view, institutions 
appear in a decentralized and spontaneous manner out of repeated human interactions. Institutions 
depend and consist of repeated behaviour. There is no political process and no central instance that 
crafts the rules, but “uncoordinated choices of many individuals” (Kingston and Caballero 2009, p. 
160). The expectation or belief that an institution guides the actions of others is enough to keep agents 
behaving in a given way and in that sense they are considered institutions as equilibria. If there are 
alternative courses of action for a given situation, it is conceivable that several agents may behave 
differently while institutions “compete” with each other to dominate the actions of agents. In the long 
run, one course of action will prevail and that will become the equilibrium institution that is sustained 
by repetition, replication and imitation. According to this view, only rules in use in the Olstromian 
terminology are proper institutions. Change is already embedded in the idea of evolutionary change, 
which is slow and endogenous. There is no explicit agent to coordinate the decision-making or the 
institutional reform process, and the selection of the institution that stands would happen 
spontaneously and signals the “most efficient” or superior solution (Williamson 2000). Aoki and 
Hayami (2001) explain that change occurs when a “general cognitive disequilibrium” happens, 
namely when an institution fails to obtain the expected results and when agents note a dissonance 
between the outcome obtained and the outcome expected.  
Kingston and Caballero (2009) identify this aspect in their critique: little attention is paid to 
explaining how and why a particular institution prevails and what this process of institutional 
competition looks like before it is resolved. Williamson (2000) claims that the prevailing institution is 
the most efficient one in reducing transaction costs and its survival can be taken as sufficient proof 
that this particular institution is the best alternative. Other authors, instead, resort to an explanation 
by partial or local equilibria that result when institutions are not placed in the same geography or 
time, so they would not be exposed to institutional competition but to geographical segmentation. 
Additionally, an institution may start locally and be adopted elsewhere but this assumes there is 
contact between groups. Other authors (for example, Hayek (1973) or Greif and Tadelis (2010)) link 
the selection process to competition among rival groups or leaders in which each group promotes its 
own solution to a certain problem or resists the institutions of another, among other reasons because 
those institutions are inconsistent with cultural norms or because of its distributional impact. In short, 
the account tells “an empirical success story” (Williamson 2000, p. 607; quoted in Kingston and 
Caballero 2009, p. 161). Once equilibrium has been established, there is little further theorization on 
what pushes agents to change the institution as equilibrium.  
Money has been analysed as an institution by several authors (Ingham 1998; Gómez 2018; 
(Aglietta and Orlean 2006, Blanc et al. 2016, Dodd 2014, Gilbert and Helleiner 1999, Goodhart 2005, 
Wray and Forstater 2006). However, such analysis has been done following strictly one of the two 
institutional perspectives presented in this section. There are a number of scholars that underlined 
the essence of money as an institution in which institutions are understood as rules (see for example, 
Wray and Forstater 2006; Aglietta and Orlean 2006; Goodhart 2005). At the same time, there are a 
number of studies that highlight the nature of money as an institution which evolved as the belief 
that a certain thing has the capacity to perform the known monetary functions (for example,Banerjee 
and Maskin 1996, Kiyotaki and Wright 1989, Selgin 2001). In both cases, there are empirical puzzles 
that remain unexplained. This paper proposes to analyse money as an institution which results from 
both centralised rules and as evolved beliefs. In the last years, there have been attempts by 
institutional scholars to combine both strands of institutional theory into a hybrid approach that 
conceptualizes “rules in equilibrium” (Hindriks and Guala 2015). This means that as several solutions 
are available, eventually one appears as the satisfactory one and can be codified, i.e. summarized as 
symbolic representation. The authors follow John Searle, who distinguished regulatory from 
constitutive rules (Searle 2005: 10), in which constitutive rules define status. Subsequent institutional 
change occurs by negotiation and centralized design, and includes the possibility that formal rules 
are nothing but endorsements of prevalent informal rules. In turn, Brousseau et al (2011) focus on 
different temporal dimensions: institutions as rules concern the shorter term in which political 
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negotiation and agreements are possible with a top-down approach, while the self-enforcing or 
equilibria account of institutions deals with the long term implied in social evolution and bottom-up 
approaches. In the meantime, Hodgson (2015) argues that rules include norms of behaviour and 
social conventions as dispositions to act in a certain way but with no certainty that behaviour will 
effectively and invariably follow. Effective behaviour is secondary to the existence of institutions, 
which are mainly a disposition to act. 
Among scholars that study money as an institution, such combination has also been initiated. 
Aglietta and Orlean (2002, p. 35), for example, underline that money is an abstraction that depends 
on trust in the “supposition that money will always be accepted in trade by third parties”. Trust, the 
authors continue, is a relationship between each private agent and the community that uses a certain 
money. According to them, trust is not a contract, so “trust cannot dispense with regulation, or 
regulation with public authority”. So, “maintaining trust must be regarded as a regulatory problem 
of the utmost importance”. They further elaborate on this point by distinguishing three types of trust. 
The first one is methodical trust, founded on routine and repetition of actions. Methodical trust, they 
claim, “pales into insignificance before the furious rivalries unleashed by the power of money” and 
hence they distinguish a second type of trust, which is hierarchical trust. The latter is imparted by the 
political authority and they consider hierarchical trust superior to methodical trust because “the 
political authority over money has the power to change the rules”. The third one is ethical trust, which 
is an ethical attitude that reconciles conflicts and develops at the social level. It ascertains that a certain 
monetary order will maintain the value of private contracts over time. Aglietta and Orlean (2006) 
touch upon the distinction of money as an equilibrium sustained by methodical trust and regularity 
and consider that this type of money is inferior to money as rules that stems from centralized political 
authority and generates hierarchical trust. If there is any conflict between the two, it will be resolved 
at the loose level of ethical trust to protect social welfare and order. The authors hence incline 
themselves in favour of the state as the final decision maker on monetary matters. As it will be argued 
in the case of Argentina, the conviction that the state can induce such an ethical trust over methodical 
trust proves exaggerated. The next section will explore money as an institution from both approaches 
through the empirical case of Argentina.  
3. Peso by Rule, Dollar by Practice 
Argentina is often mentioned as a “laboratory” in terms of monetary and financial systems (for 
example, Della Paolera et al. 2003, Ginieniewicz and Castiglione 2011, Mogliani et al. 2009, North 
2008). Since its origins the country has been prone to inflation and monetary instability, in 
combination with particularly deep and long downturns of the economic cycle (Gerchunoff and Llach 
2005). Among the historians, Cortes Conde (1989) traces Argentine monetary instability already to 
the period 1880–1914, when there was a Currency Conversion Board and free banking system based 
on a gold standard(Bozzoli and della Paolera 2014, Della Paolera et al. 2003).  
Simultaneous deficits in the external current account and the fiscal accounts were often met with 
policies that attempted to control both government spending and exchange rates at the same time 
(Cortés Conde and Harriague 2006). But this could not prevent two-digit inflation rates from 
becoming normal. Some of these policies involved changes in the regulations on commercial and 
state-owned banks alike, as well as restrictions on the use of reserves and deposits, which 
undermined the credibility of the banking system in general. The combination of controls over the 
exchange rates, national inflation and low trust in the banking system created a parallel “black 
market” for foreign currency in which U.S. dollars were sold for more pesos than the restricted official 
exchange rate. Arbitration between the official and the black market dollar became a profitable 
business, while the U.S. dollar became the preferred currency to reserve value. 
From an institutional point of view, the attempts of the central bank and other monetary 
authorities to control the key financial variables represent centralised and deliberate efforts to 
configure rules that organise economic life. The emphasis among the Argentine monetary authorities 
was placed on making the national currency a reliable unit of account, means of payment and reserve 
of value, while retaining control of the main financial variables in the hands of the state. However, 
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institutions as rules depend on the capacities of the state or other authorities to enforce these rules. 
Inflation and instability undermined these capacities and actors such as the central bank and the 
Treasury, that were supposed to mediate the link between rules and effective behaviour, saw their 
capacities eroded by the poor performance of the Argentine money. In turn, this undermined other 
agents in the monetary system such as commercial banks.  
By the end of the 1950s, high inflation and unstable business cycles introduced the practice of 
buying dollars as reserve of value and keeping them out of the banking system (Canitrot 1981). 
Argentines gradually adopted the dollar as a second currency. Initially it was only a reserve of value 
but around the 1970s dollar-denominated prices gradually became common practice. The U.S. dollar 
became accepted in the transfers of goods such as houses and cars and long term contracts (Gaggero 
and Nemiña 2016). By the 1980s, U.S. dollars were accepted as means of payment to trade most goods 
and services. In other words, the U.S. dollar was performing functions that national currencies do. 
The use of the U.S. dollar as second currency was not designed by any central authority but happened 
gradually, uncoordinated, spontaneously. Muir (2015) considers this behaviour especially prevalent 
among Argentine middle classes and contributed to the symbolic construction of the “small saver”.  
The inflationary problem eventually derived in three hyperinflation periods between May 1989 
and the end of 1990. Following that serious financial crisis, a monetary policy was launched that 
aimed at rebuilding the institutions regulating the relationship between Argentines and their money. 
It was introduced in March 1991 under the name of convertibility plan because the core policy was a 
currency board that pegged the peso to the U.S. dollar at a rate of 1 to 1. Equally important from an 
institutional point of view, the new plan allowed economic agents to open bank accounts, denominate 
prices or trade in U.S. dollars. In other words, the rule in use of adopting the U.S. dollar as unit of 
account and means of payment together with the official Argentine currency was formally adopted 
as a rule by the government. From currency in practice, the dollar became a currency as rule.  
In the long run, inflation and a series of failed monetary policies contributed to form a peculiar 
understanding of money among many Argentines as a flexible social construction. Indeed, experience 
showed them that it can be transformed. In 1969 a new currency was introduced by law, changing 
100 of the old circulating units for one unit of a new one. The measure did not work to stop inflation 
and was repeated in 1983, when 10,000 units of the circulating currency were changed for one unit of 
the new Argentine peso. That second reduction in the amount of digits was not effective either to 
regain trust and inflation eroded the value of the currency even faster. A third change occurred in 
1985, when 1000 units of circulating Argentine pesos were changed for one unit of the new currency, 
named Austral. That currency vanished with hyperinflation, and it was replaced again in 1992 at a 
rate of 10,000 Australes for one new peso. In total, four changes of currency denominations scrapped 
thirteen digits off the unit of account between 1969 and 1992 (Billetes Argentinos 2008). 
The reforms in the currency reflect the difference between institutions as rules and actual 
behaviour. According to Hodgson (2006), rules are dispositions or injunctions to act in a certain way 
but do not establish behaviour per se. Indeed, the Argentine currency did not maintain its stability to 
serve as reserve of value, means of payment and unit of account. In the Ostromian terminology, the 
peso was partially performing as a currency in form and lost ground as currency in use. The U.S. 
dollar, instead, evolved as a currency in use, in the line of the approach of institutions as equilibria. 
It became accepted by the pervasive expectation that others would accept it too.  
However, the official monetary authorities did not surrender their powers over the monetary 
system. As soon as the central bank regained some capacity to enforce rules, they tried to affect the 
bimonetary equilibrium and regain space for the official currency. Following another financial crisis 
with capital outflows, the Argentine government imposed a series of restrictions on the currency 
exchange in force between 2011 and 2015. The regulations restricted the rights to buy foreign currency 
and were difficult to impose because it implied the government could effectively distinguish who 
wanted foreign currency as reserve of value and for other purposes. The measures recreated a black 
market for foreign currency and were gradually relaxed until the new government abandoned them 
completely in December 2015. 
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Luzzi and Wilkis (2018) discussed the implications of this attempt of the official monetary 
authorities to regain their sovereignty over the currency in Argentina. Despite the regulations to 
“domesticate” it, bimonetary practices presented a remarkable resistance to change. Resilience is a 
key element of the conceptualisation of institutions as equilibria. In the terminology proposed by 
Brousseau et al. (2011), bimonetarism evolved as an institution and was not only resistant to change 
but also self-enforcing by mutual expectations. However, the restrictions cannot be considered a 
complete failure, highlighting that this competition between two currencies is not a normal monetary 
practice in other countries and has social costs.  
4. A hybrid Institution: Community Complementary Currencies 
It was mentioned above that in 1995 the currency board system was challenged by an 
international financial crisis that started when Mexico devalued its currency. The Argentine economy 
adjusted by deflation and recession which in turn translated into a loss of jobs and income. 
Unemployment had risen gradually throughout the 1990s, but in 1995 the unemployment rate hit 
18.8 per cent. Used to the term “hyper-inflation”, Argentines were introduced to the term “hyper-
unemployment” when media and experts used the word to describe the new situation. The 
purchasing power of wages in 1995 fell to 68 per cent of their 1986 level and 62 per cent of their 1975 
level. Another term that became common around that time was that of the “new poor” to describe 
households that had fallen under the poverty line for the first time. Only a decade earlier, 70 per cent 
of the Argentine population had declared itself to be part of the middle class (Minujín and Kessler 
1995). The new poor were the shopkeepers, public servants, skilled workers, graduates, blue-collar 
workers, bank clerks, teachers and small-firm owners, among others whose basic needs were covered 
who could no longer afford their lifestyle.  
Amidst this environment of economic demise, civil society organisations launched a number of 
small-scale bottom-up initiatives to reorganise social life at the community level (Gomez 2009, Gómez 
and Dini 2016). Among them was the Club de Trueque, a circle of neighbours that exchanged goods 
and services with each other and was launched in May 1995. The informal exchange of goods within 
a closed network of impoverished middle-class members was initially carried out in one organiser’s 
garage. Participants offered care services, home-made foods, handmade toiletries, organically-grown 
vegetables in their gardens, and all sorts of handicrafts. After six months of testing different methods 
with 25 to 50 participants meeting every Saturday, the group developed an exchange system that 
they found to be effective and practical. Participants came into the garage and placed their products 
on a table. The value was calculated at the formal market prices and was recorded on individual cards 
carried by the participants and on a computer worksheet. When the value of everyone’s products had 
been recorded, participants turned to the role of consumers to choose what they wanted to take. The 
value of their acquisitions was deducted from the amount on their cards. Thus, the higher the value 
of the products brought, the more the producer would get of other people’s products. Any producer 
who did not agree with the price given to a product was free to withdraw it, but that hardly ever 
happened. When people thought the price was low, they viewed it as a partial gift to others, which 
they would recover some other time when they obtained something below the regular price. When 
they left, their sales and purchases were entered as debits and credits on a computer worksheet. The 
overall balance roughly returned to zero every week. The remaining credits and debits were 
transferred to the following meeting. The system emulated a closed market in which exchanges were 
multireciprocal, so two individuals did not need to coincide with each other directly. The payment 
system was a novelty- it was not based on bartering or making payments through a basic commodity 
but was based on mutual credit/debts in an accountancy system. 
It quickly became clear to the organisers that book-keeping on the basis of individual cards and 
computer records was hitting a limit. The organisers felt that entering transactions into the computer 
file was too burdensome and time consuming. Besides, they did not like the centralisation inherent 
in the system. “I was at the centre and we didn’t like the idea of centres. As ecologists, we believed 
in autonomous self-regulation, like the environment is. The cards were blocking the potential of the 
scheme” (Interview with an initiator, Bernal, 13 June 2004). The successful propagation of two more 
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nodes made the limitations of the individual card accountancy system more evident. Moreover, 
participants often travelled considerable distances to participate in the Trueque market, which means 
a waste of time and money. One of the organisers then got an innovative idea to facilitate the 
payments. He recalled, “One day I was walking by a print shop and saw their business cards. Then I 
thought, ‘Why don’t we just make vouchers that can circulate among the members to pay each other?’ 
We could just print them, right? So we went into the shop and asked the shopkeeper to make us some 
notes”. The others liked the idea of using vouchers as means of payment because of its practicality 
and because it removed them from the centre.  
The scheme was so successful that it grew and the original organisers replicated it in the 
locations of friends and contacts across the city of Buenos Aires, at first, and the rest of the country, 
later on. Surrogate currencies were instituted in each Trueque node. Every new participant received a 
credit of fifty créditos so they could start trading, but they were committed to giving them back if 
they left the group. In comparison with the card system, physical notes were easier to handle. 
Organisers and participants alike assure that nobody perceived the vouchers as money but as the 
system grew, it slowly dawned on them that the vouchers were a social type of money. Anyone in 
the Trueque would accept the notes, but they were normally not convertible to pesos. By all means, 
Trueque created an institutional equivalent of what is considered money in modern economies. It was 
an abstract means of payment, depersonalised, dematerialised, transferable promise to pay (Gomez 
2010, Gonzalez Bombal 2002, North and Huber 2004). The créditos were printed in denominations 
following those of the formal economy. Not surprisingly, the money was called crédito, indicating 
that members “gave credit to each other because we trust everyone here” (Interview with initiator, 
Bernal, 6 September 2004). 
In the middle run, complementary currency systems (CCS) printed by grassroots organisations 
emerged at the local, regional and national levels. The initiative kept replicating, hence forming 
regional and national networks, together with umbrella organisations that kept them interconnected 
or steered replication rather hierarchically. The Redes de Trueque turned out to be the largest 
experiment with a complementary currency system in the world in modern times. According to 
unofficial figures, by the beginning of 2002, with the regular economy melting down, the Redes de 
Trueque reached a peak of 2.5 million participants in 4700 centres across the country (Ovalles 2002). 
There are no official statistics that would allow a more accurate estimation of how large they were 
and what their exact impact as an anti-cyclical device was. An indicative estimation is presented in 
Figure 1, which combines data from several sources and is meant only as an indication of their scale. 
Colacelli and Blackburn (2009) have a small and partial dataset that would corroborate these figures 
in the location where they gathered data. 
 
Figure 1. Size of Trueque in terms of participants and centres or clubs. Sources: Ovalles (2002) for 1995–
2002; La Nación for 2003; author’s estimation for 2004–2006 based on RT groups visited and 
information given by participants. Estimations refer to the beginning of each year. 
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In terms of the modern monetary practice of ‘one country, one currency’, the creation of a 
currency system of the scale of the Trueque is a real anomaly. It is clear that an economic demise that 
chopped 20 per cent of the GDP contributed greatly to the phenomenon. However, other countries 
in recent decades have had similarly severe economic downturns and their monetary system stuck 
to one currency. The Trueque calls for a broader explanation to bring new insights into the origins and 
meanings of money. In relation to the extended complementary currency systems in the U.S.A. and 
Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, the main difference was organisational: the Trueque was structured in 
regional and national networks articulating local markets. Each one issued its own currency, which 
was normally accepted in other neighbourhoods and networks too, so it was possible to pay for goods 
and services with the same scrip across the whole country. For some time, there was an umbrella 
organisation checking each other’s currency systems; before and after its existence, scrip was 
accepted simply out of trust in the system. Similar integration has been attempted less successfully 
on a regional level in places like Manchester, UK, but with limited success (North 2006). Nowhere 
has an attempt been made to create a national, private, yet not-for-profit monetary system as the 
Trueque.  
In the longer run, the use of community currencies promoted the launch of new small businesses 
that could learn their trade in a protected market, and helped the unemployed to survive their 
disenfranchisement and return to regular jobs when the economy recovered. Thus, the institutions of 
the community currency systems were clearly responsive, but they proved not to be resilient. With 
several million participants, it had grown beyond the scale in which it was appropriate to “trust 
everyone here”; shirking and opportunistic behaviour became rampant. The institutional weaknesses 
of the Trueque became evident at exactly the same time as the regular economy started a period of 
vigorous recovery, and within a year, by 2003, they collapsed to about a fifth of their peak size. Still, 
the fieldwork done in 2013 proved that the Trueque did not disappear completely but became much 
smaller.  
Are complimentary currency systems institutions as rules or institutions as equilibria? On the 
one hand, the Trueque had been established by deliberation, negotiation and agreement along the 
lines described in the institution as rules approach. The leaders and organisers performed the role of 
“autonomous drivers of change” as described by Kingston and Caballero (2009, p. 158). They 
discussed and made a myriad of decisions at different levels, including the design and name of the 
currency, the amounts to print, the methods to distribute it among existing and new members, and 
the participants that would be allowed to join and would be required to follow these procedures. The 
leaders kept reframing and improving the scheme, while the number of participants soared. They 
had to decide on the institutions to guide the behaviour of participants, setting rules for who was 
allowed to join, what was acceptable and what was not. The collective action process by which 
institutions as rules were made proved to be complex and exhausting, yet rules were made. The 
outcomes of these negotiations were institutions as rules that regulated the actions of members who 
had voluntarily accepted to abide by them. There was a clear and open commitment in the 
community to abide by the rules, which is an additional factor theorized by Gilbert (1992 197) as the 
common understanding that under certain conditions people are jointly bound to pursue a certain 
action as long as they all do the same action. At the same time, the leaders had insufficient means to 
enforce the rules and sanction trespassers. They could not prevent massive forgery of the currency, 
abusive behaviour with prices and widespread speculation. They had created institutions as rules 
that did not always translate into effective action in the long run, as it happens with so many other 
institutions as rules created at the grassroots level. Eventually, the collapse of the Redes de Trueque 
does not undermine the significance of these complementary currencies that performed as units of 
account and means of payment among thousands of Argentines for about a decade (Gomez 2010, 
Plasencia and Gutierrez 2006).  
On the other hand, the complementary currency systems show traits of evolved institutions. The 
growth from one small and local Club de Trueque to a complementary currency system of over 2.5 
million members took place without centralised and deliberate design. Groups across the country 
spontaneously imitated and replicated the initiative across the country. There was no coordinated 
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planning such as, for example, where to locate them, but barely copying and replicating what other 
groups were doing nearby. Participants in one Club de Trueque would often learn the rules and get 
the idea to launch one in their neighbourhood. They obtained information and know-how on how to 
run one informally by word of mouth, through the media, by contacting an organiser in their own 
personal networks or simply learning by doing. The expansion of the Redes de Trueque around every 
corner is mainly a tale of evolved institutions that spontaneously disseminated the initiative by 
gaining ground from the failing official currency. Since there were no legal regulations supporting 
them, they were primarily self-enforcing institutions, according to the terminology suggested by 
Brousseau et al. (2011). 
In terms of institutional theory, the complementary currency systems present a puzzle: they 
cannot be conceptualised as either institutions as rules or institutions as equilibria. It would be easy 
to dismiss them because they were relatively small and collapsed in the end but they existed long 
enough and reached a scale that merits a more elaborate explanation. The Argentine complementary 
currency systems show characteristics corresponding to both institutional narratives. However, they 
did not prove their resilience in the longer run and collapsed quickly. A note should be added about 
their responsiveness, and that is that they continue to exist in some locations, away from the public 
attention and the media. Moreover, they tend to reappear as soon as recession or a new financial crisis 
dawns in the horizon  
5. Reflections  
This paper has analysed the plurality of money in Argentina arguing for the use of plurals to 
refer to institutions and moneys. To move forward and analyse the implications of understanding 
moneys as institutions in the event of a new financial crisis, the discussion required a clear 
conceptualization of money as an institution. At the risk of overgeneralizing, there are two prevalent 
approaches to institutions, namely as rules and as equilibria. The first one focuses on centralized 
design, bargaining and authority to establish rules of use and form. The second one defines 
institutions as equilibria and underlines their evolutionary nature with a period of competition after 
which one outcome prevails and remains in equilibrium. Is money an institution as rule or an 
institution as equilibrium? 
Research discussing these two narratives on institutions has not resorted to empirical 
explorations. This article presents an empirically informed discussion of money as an institution 
drawing on insights from the two main strands of institutional theory, while it avoids an evaluation 
of which one is more correct. It has discussed the issues of resilience and responsiveness of the 
currencies, the role of centralised monetary authority and the means of enforcement or self-
enforcement that make the monetary institutions stable in the longer run. In a nutshell, the national 
sovereign currency of Argentina, the peso, emerged within the formation process of the nation state 
in the 19th century. Throughout the 20th century the imbalances in the Argentine economy 
undermined the performance of the monetary system, including episodes of hyper-inflation, poor 
performance of the functions of money, low trust in the central bank and other monetary authorities, 
and a generalized weakness of the banking system. The formal institution of money as a rule did not 
perform in reality all the functions that are expected of money. Gradually, the population adopted 
the U.S. dollar as unit of account and reserve of value, and later on also as means of payment, so 
Argentina became a bimonetary economy. The emergence of the U.S. dollar as an alternative further 
undermined the long-term credibility of the peso as the national currency sustained by the state, i.e. 
the currency as rule. In turn, various failed efforts to rescue the functionality of the national currency 
diluted the legitimacy of the monetary authorities to impose a national currency.  
Contrary to the claim by Aglietta and Orlean (2002) that hierarchical trust (by state regulation) 
is superior to methodical trust (by evolved regularity), the Argentine case suggests that use of the 
U.S. dollar as an institution in equilibrium has proved self-enforcing, extremely resistant to change 
and defiant of the state’s authority. Methodical trust has resisted the monetary authorities’ 
determination to win the wrestle between its centrally designed currency (the peso) and the 
spontaneously adopted currency (the U.S. dollar). At the same time, the phenomenon of 
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bimonetarism has not been responsive to the demands for social change and inclusiveness of some 
sectors of the Argentine population. 
A third type of currency was widespread between 1995 and 2005. The Redes de Trueque were born 
small, and spread fast across the country. These community currency systems were launched during 
a financial crisis and had their greatest expansion during the economic meltdown around the turn of 
the millennium. They represented a hybrid category between institutions as rules and institutions as 
equilibria and exhibit traits of both approaches. That is, they were centrally designed and sustained 
by grassroots organisations while they expanded rather autonomously across the country by the 
copying, imitation and replication of local initiatives. The case of the Redes de Trueque also suggest 
that the centralised design of institutions as rules is time consuming and requires a myriad of 
decisions and agreements to make them work, even if this is partial and lacking the means to sanction 
trespasses. As there are various types of money, the article refers to money as institutions, in its plural 
forms, because spontaneous evolution and centralized design do appear together in different 
combinations to generate money. Monies such as complementary currencies are hybrids between 
institutions as equilibria and institutions as rules.  
The expansion of the complementary currencies was sustained by need and the crisis of the 
regular economy, so they were clearly responsive but did not prove to be resilient and collapsed after 
a few years. They could not resist the combination of opportunistic behaviour and the recovery of the 
regular economy and these institutions fell into demise. In a nutshell, they expanded rather 
autonomously in a decentralized manner, and they collapsed in competition with the regular 
economy and its money as rule. These institutions as rules had been agreed at the central level of the 
Redes de Trueque, so they expanded by belief and expectations and collapsed by disbelief and negative 
expectations. In comparison with the use of the U.S. dollar as evolved institution, the complementary 
currency systems could not be seen as having reached long term equilibrium. While the Argentine 
state failed to regain the exclusivity of the national currency in the monetary system against the U.S. 
dollar, in the case of the complementary currency systems the state did not need to take exceptional 
measures to reduce them. The question which begs to be asked is how long does an institution need 
to be in equilibrium to become a rule, or viceversa, how long does a rule need to be enforced until it 
becomes self-enforcing? 
This discussion offers tools to rethink bimonetarism, not by continuing what seems a lost battle 
against the endogenously adopted currency (U.S. dollar) but by designing additional features on this 
institution as equilibrium in order to move towards a hybrid. Such policies would have higher 
chances of success because they would not be fighting against what is already a resilient and 
established practice. At the same time, it suggests working on strengthening the institution as a rule, 
the peso, in search of a hybrid that would keep both currencies but with more elements of the 
centrally designed institution that exist at present.  
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